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THE DIVERSITY DICHOTOMY: THE SUPREME
COURT'S RETICENCE TO GIVE RACE A CAPITAL "R"
Tanya Washington*
I. INTRODUCTION
This past term the United States Supreme Court gave a nod to the
use of race-conscious admissions programs in its twin decisions Grutter v.
Bollinger' and Gratz v. Bollinger.2 Despite the favorable result reached by
the majority in Grutter, which upheld the constitutionality of the
University of Michigan Law School's admissions practices, its poorly
reasoned opinion glossed over the compelling interest prong of the strict
scrutiny analysis, dictating the opposite result in Gratz, in which the
Court invalidated the University of Michigan's undergraduate admis-
sions policy. Proponents of racial diversity may criticize the Gratz
decision as inconsistent with Gmtter's holding that the educational
benefits derived from racial diversity constitute a compelling interest,
and may characterize Gratz as enigmatic; however, it is the majority's
opinion in Grutter that provides the more appropriate target for criticism.
The majority's reluctance to articulate the exogeneic aspect of the
race concept, which informs the central thesis of the diversity rationale,
coupled with its refusal to specifically describe the interest served by
racial heterogeneity, distorted the application of both prongs of the
constitutional test.3 The Grutter majority's acknowledgment of the
compelling interest at issue was so abstruse that it was easy for the Court
in Gratz to reject the undergraduate admissions policy as incongruent
and disproportionate to that ill-defined end. The Grutter majority's
vacuous examination of the racial diversity rationale casts a shadow of
skepticism over its announcement that racial heterogeneity serves a
* Assistant Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to sincerely
thank my colleagues at Georgia State College of Law for their support and encouragement during the
completion of this Article.
1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
2. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
3. Because the University of Michigan's admissions practice involves race-conscious determinations,
strict scrutiny applies. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (plurality opinion of
Powell,J.). This exacting constitutional test requires that the state action at issue is geared toward achieving
a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to that end. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 227 (1995) ("[A]ny person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor
subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under
the strictest judicial scrutiny.").
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compelling state interest and rendered the Gratz decision the first
casualty of Grutter's flawed reasoning.
Though the majority's opinion in Grutter resolved the battle waged
against race-conscious admissions policies in favor of the University of
Michigan Law School, it ultimately foreshadows defeat for diversity
advocates in the war being waged against the consideration of race to
achieve educational prerogatives. The majority's qualified endorsement
of racial diversity as an educational imperative weakened its recognition
that racial diversity's educational yield is a compelling interest. By
reaching the right result for the wrong reasons, the majority may have
frustrated advocates' ability to present the racial diversity rationale as a
constitutionally viablejustification for race conscious admissions policies,
and ultimately may have done more harm than good.
This Article addresses three critical errors committed by the Grutter
majority in determining that racial heterogeneity is an educational
essential. First, the majority failed to effectively distinguish racial diver-
sity from remedial affirmative action, which reinforces the prevailing
view that the racial diversity argument is a pretensed justification for
race-conscious state action. This error was exacerbated by the major-
ity's mischaracterization of student body diversity as the constitutionally
compelling aspiration rather than as the means by which the Law
School endeavored to achieve the educational yield of student body
heterogeneity. Second, the majority neglected to articulate the racial
diversity justification's distinct conception of race. This failure com-
pelled the majority to seize upon a twenty-five-year sunset provision that
is both arbitrary and incongruent with a reasoned consideration of the
constituent aspects of the race concept. Third, the majority dispensed
with a searching examination of the appreciable nexus between racial
heterogeneity and an enhanced learning environment, opting instead for
the convenience of blind deference to the Law School, which deprived
the school's assertion of much of the credibility to which it is legitimately
entitled.
The success of the racial diversity argument, despite its unifying
aspiration to enrich the learning environment for every student in the
classroom, depends on an acknowledgment of the existence and signifi-
cance of the "color-line" discerned by W.E.B. DuBois one hundred
years ago,' and recognition of the reality this racial demarcation con-
tinues to create. This contingency poses the greatest challenge to racial
diversity as a constitutional justification for race-conscious admissions
4. W.E.B. DUBOiS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 10 (1903). It is somewhat intriguing that the
Gruter majority's refusal to acknowledge the color line occurred exactly one hundred years after W.E.B.
DuBois's observation of the racial delineation.
978
2004] THE DIVERSITYDICHOTOMY 979
policies. The argument insists upon an unequivocal acknowledgment
of the difference in the political, social, and economic realities experi-
enced by those on either side of the color line, yet the establishing hand
of this disparity is reluctant to acknowledge its truth.
II. DISTINGUISHING RACIAL DIVERSITY FROM
REMEDIAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Because remedial affirmative action has enjoyed notable status as the
chief, though, as the Grutter majority emphasizes,5 not the sole constitu-
tional justification for race-conscious state action, the key to racial
diversity's success as an alternative and equally legitimate justification
lies in articulating its distinctive aspirations, motivations, and character.
From its inception, racial diversity6 has been portrayed by both oppo-
nents and advocates as a default justification for remedial affirmative
action policy. Proponents of affirmative action, seeking to ameliorate
the inequity caused by generations of government-enforced racial segre-
gation and discrimination in the education context, advocated for
increased admission of students of color into American institutions of
higher learning on the grounds that it would serve to remedy past and
present injustices by affording the historically excluded access to educa-
tional opportunities.7 As the political climate became less accommodat-
5. The majority opines,
We first wish to dispel the notion that the Law School's argument has been foreclosed, either
expressly or implicitly, by our affirmative-action cases decided since Bakke. It is true that
some language in those opinions might be read to suggest that remedying past discrimination
is the only permissible justification for race-based governmental action .... But we have
never held that the only governmental use of race that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying
past discrimination. Nor, since Bakke, have we directly addressed the use of race in the
context of public higher education. Today, we hold that the Law School has a compelling
interest in attaining a diverse student body.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338-39 (citations omitted). Notably absent from this passage is a reference to racial
diversity and notably present is the mischaracterization of the means (racial diversity) as the end (the
educational yield of racial diversity). This Article addresses the significance and consequence of this error.
6. In this Article diversity refers to racial diversity. I enthusiastically acknowledge that socio-
economic diversity, religious diversity, ethnic diversity, and other characteristics that contribute to
experiential diversity can also be considered by institutions of higher learning making admissions
determinations. I distinguish racial diversity from these other forms ofdiversity based on this nation's long
and rich relationship with race. The fact that race was at the center of the only civil war in this nation's
history and has been the subject of three constitutional amendments are testimonies to its unique
significance.
7. "Affirmative action focuses on the group or groups that an entity .. would like to benefit. The
rationale for its use may include such things as prior discrimination or underrepresentation. It is generally
conceived as a stopgap measure designed to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination." Arnold Loewy,
Taking Bakke Seriously: Di ishing Diversity From Affumative Action in the Law SchoolAdmissions Process, 77 N.C.
L. REV. 1479, 1479 (1999).
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ing of these aims,' affirmative action advocates presented racial diversity
as a more politically palatable justification that would serve the same
end.9 Thus diversity, like an ill-prepared understudy, was thrust into a
spotlight of constitutional scrutiny and mixed reviews from an anxious
audience.
The Grutter majority's refusal to present racial diversity as distinct and
independent from remedial affirmative action furthered the fallacy that
racial diversity is merely a counterfeit remedial affirmative action argu-
ment. 0 Though the majority emphasized that the Law School's con-
sideration of race in its admissions determinations served the constitu-
tionally permissible goal of "obtaining the educational benefits that flow
from a diverse student body,"" the Court failed to establish racial
diversity as philosophically and characteristically distinguishable from
remedial affirmative action. Clarifying the distinct aspects of racial
diversity would have preserved it as a legitimate justification for race-
conscious admissions policies and programs. The majority's failure to
distinguish diversity cast it in the traditional garb of affirmative action
and presented it as a quasi-remedial rationalization for remedying past
and present racial discrimination, rather than as an appropriate and
effective means of enhancing the quality of the educational experience
at this nation's institutions of higher learning.
In presenting the rationale in its most persuasive posture, racial
diversity as the means of achieving a constitutionally compelling interest
must be distinguished from racial diversity as the compelling interest.
This distinction is not merely a matter of semantics. The characteriza-
tion of racial diversity as a means or an end determines whether it is a
8. "A political backlash against affirmative action dates back at least to the shift of working-class
white Democrats to the Republican Party in the first Reagan election." Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Future
ofAffirmative Action: After Affirmative Action, 59 OHIO ST. LJ. 1039, 1040 (1998). See Paul Gaston, Honor to the
Class of'69." Rejlections on Affinnative Action. Its Origins, irtues, Enemies, Champions, and Prospects (1999), available
at http://www.'irginia.edu/topnewvs/releases/aa.html, for an interesting discussion of the demise of
affirmative action policy.
9. "[B]ecause of Justice Powell's emphasis on the almost unique legitimacy of 'diversity' as a
constitutional value, it has become the favorite catchword-indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say
'mantra'-of those defending the use of racial or ethnic preferences .... 'Diversity' is thus a ubiquitous topic
of contemporary discourse." Sanford Levinson, 1999 Owenj. Roberts Menorial Dizersio Lecture, 2 U. PA.J.
CONST. L. 573,578 (2000); see also Tanya Y. Murphy,AnArgumentforDiversity BasedAffimative Action in Hgher
Education, 95 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 515, 536 (1996) ("Although affirmative action was created specifically for
remedial purposes, today the primary, and perhaps only,justification for the retention of affirmative action
programs is educational diversity.").
10. Justice Kennedy observed in his dissent, "Many academics at other law schools who are
affirmative action's more forthright defenders readily concede that diversity is merely the current rationale
of convenience for a policy that they prefer to justify on other grounds." Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2373
(KennedyJ, dissenting) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
11. Id. at 2347.
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constitutional consideration or an unconstitutional aim. Supreme Court
precedent has rejected racial diversity or racial balancing as unconstitu-
tional. 12 Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke emphasizes that the use of
ethnic diversity simply to achieve racial heterogeneity, even as part of
the consideration of a number of factors, is unconstitutional.'" The
constitutional issue should be securing the educational benefits racial
diversity produces, not achieving heterogeneity. 4
The mischaracterization of racial diversity as an end rather than as
a means invites confusion because both remedial affirmative action and
racial diversity produce the same result: increased enrollment of racial
minorities.'5 The Grutter majority properly rejected racial balancing as
the aim or motivating impulse of the racial diversity justification, but
failed to distinguish clearly between a characterization of racial diversity
as the means of achieving a compelling interest and racial diversity as
the desired end.'6
In paraphrasing the Law School's articulated justification for its race-
conscious admissions program, "[to obtain] 'the educational benefits
that flow from a diverse student body,"' the majority mangled the
means-ends analysis and stated, "the Law School asks us to recognize,
in the context of higher education, a compelling state interest in student
body diversity." " Therefore the majority identified student body diversity
12. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992) ("Racial balance is not to be achieved for its own
sake"); City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989).
13. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (Justice Powell emphasizes, "It
is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect
guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups.").
14. Id. at 312-15.
15. Like the Law School, the University ofTexas Law School defended its race-conscious admissions
program as necessary to obtain the educational. benefits that flow from a racially and ethnically diverse
student body. In its Hopwood decision, the Fifth Circuit determined that the University of Texas's race-
conscious admissions program, which the court considered to be a racial preference, was not operating in
pursuit of a constitutionally compelling aim. The court rejected the university's assertion that racial hetero-
geneity yields educational benefits and contended that "the classification of persons on the basis of race for
the purpose of diversity frustrates, rather than facilitates, the goals of equal protection." Hopwood v. Texas,
78 F.3d. 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996), The reasoning underlying the Fifth Circuit's decision evidenced the
Court's adherence to the common misconception that racial diversity and remedial affirmative action are
indistinguishable in that they both pursue the same "wholesome purpose of correcting perceived racial
imbalance in the student body." Id. at 934. Rather than considering the legitimacy of the university's
asserted interest in enhancing the educational experience and environment it provides to its students, the
Fifth Circuit mangled the compelling interest inquiry by attributing to racial diversity an unconstitutional
trajectory -the consideration of race to increase the number of racial minorities enrolled at the university.
16. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
17. Id. at 2338. The majority's holding explicitly identified student body diversity as the compelling
state interest. It said, "(NV]e endorseJustice Powell's view that student body diversity is a compelling state
interest that canjustif, the use of race in university admissions." Id. at 2337.
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as the compelling state interest. Conversely, later in the opinion, when
the majority identified the interest to which the Law School'S admissions
practices must be closely calibrated, itobserved that "the Law School's
concept of critical mass is defined by reference to the educational bene-
fits that diversity is designed to produce." 8 This statement implicitly
identified the educational benefits to which racial diversity contributes
as the compelling interest. The majority's inconsistency in this regard
was not lost on Justice Thomas, who criticized the majority opinion,
observing,
Unlike the majority, I seek to define with precision the interest being
asserted by the Law School before determining whether that interest
is so compelling as to justify racial discrimination. The Law School
maintains that it wishes to obtain "educational benefits that flow from
student body diversity." This statement must be evaluated carefully,
because it implies that both "diversity" and "educational benefits" are
components of the Law School's compelling state interest.
Attaining "diversity," whatever it means, is the mechanism by which
the Law School obtains educational benefits, not an end of itself.'9
The majority's Confusion over whether. to define racial diversity as a
means or an end derives fromJustice Powell's ambiguous labeling of the
relevant means and end. His decision in Bakke reflects a certain measure
of inconsistency; at one point in his opinion he stated, "Ethnic diversity
... is only one element in a range of factors a university properly may
consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student body." 2" This state-
ment characterized heterogeneity as the end to be achieved. However,
Justice Powell later opined, "The diversity thatfurthers a compelling state
interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteris-
tics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important
element, 21 thus characterizing racial diversity as the means ofachieving
constitutionally important educational imperatives.
Whatever the origins of the confusion, the Grutter majority's failure to
clearly and consistently consider racial diversity as an instrument
designed to achieve educational imperatives invited attacks on racial
diversity as constitutionally illegitimate.2 It also cast as equivocal the
18. Id. at 2339.
19. Id. at 2332-53 (Thomas,J, dissenting) (citation omitted).
20. Regents of the Univ. ofCal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-15 (1978) (italics added).
21. Id. (italics added).
22. Justice Thomas criticized the majority's reluctance to clearly define the compelling interest at
issue, stating, "The Law School[ ] apparently believes that only a racially mixed student body can lead to
educational benefits it seeks. How, then, is the Law School's interest in these allegedly unique educational.
'benefits' not simply the forbidden interest in 'racial balancing,' that the majority expressly rejects?" Gruter,
123 S. Ct. at 2353 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
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majority's assessment of the proportionality and congruence of the Law
School race-conscious admissions program to the educational yield of
racial heterogeneity. The ambiguity raised thequestion as to how you
can measure the fit of the means to the end when you fail to adequately
distinguish between and properly label the two? In short, the majority's
mischaracterization of racial diversity deprived the rationale of a
significant amount of credibility.
The majority's means-end mix up was compounded by its failure to
enumerate and distinguish the character, motivations, and aspirations
of thediversity rationale from those of remedial affirmative action. Dis-
tinguishing affirmative action from diversity does not diminish the per-
suasiveness of the former rationale, which remains a necessary instru-
ment for achieving the legitimate aim of addressing past and continuing
racial discrimination. Consideration of the differences between the two
theoriesjustifying race-conscious determinations does, however, inform
the constitutionality ofdiversity. The polestar consideration of remedial
affirmative action is redressing the injury resulting from dejure and de
facto discrimination against persons on the basis of their race by creating
and implementing practices that allow members of previously excluded
racial groups access to higher education in the United States.23 Reme-
dial affirmative action is-largely characterized and motivated by the
politics of inclusion 24 and considerations of equity.2 5 Its orientation is
retrospective; it is preoccupied with curing past harms, though it also
acknowledges and utilizes present day discriminatory practices to justify
race-conscious admissions policies.26 The targeted class of beneficiaries
of remedial affirmative action is comprised principally of those racial
23. Samuel Issacharoff, lm. and Misdirection in the Debate of Affuimative Action, 2002 U. CHI..LEGAL F.
11 (2002); Melissa Cole, The Color Blind Constitution, Ciil RihtsTalk, and Mulicultural Discourse for a Post-
Reparations Vorld, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 127 (1999).
24. It is interesting to note that the Grutter majority offers in support of the racial diversity rationale
an argument that refers to one of the most distinguishing characteristics of remedial affirmathe action. It
opined, "Access to legal education (and thus the legal profession) must be inclusive oftalented and qualified
indiduals of race and ethnicity," highlighting the chiefaspiration of remedial affirmative action inclusion.
Grtter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
25. Affirmative action in college admissions dates back at least to the 1960s. Though the term
"affirmative action" first appeared in President Kennedy's Executive Order No. 10925 in 1961, see Exec.
Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. § 448 "(1959-1964), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1994), it did not receive
widespread implementation until President Lyndon Johnson's Executive Order 11246, issued in 1965,
requiring public and private institutions contracting with the federal government to affirmatively seek out
and employ qualified and underrepresented minorities. See DEBORAHJ. CARTER & REGINALD WILSON,
AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, MINORITIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 7 (1996).
26. Corrine E. Anderson, Comment, The Current Perspecte: The Erosion ofAffirnative Action in University
Admissions, 32 AKRON L. REV. 181 (1999).
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assignees historically subject to state sanctioned and enforced racism.2 7
The remedial affirmative action rationale does not stand in opposition
to the assertion that racial diversity is of educational value, yet the
educational yield of heterogeneity is neither among its chief aspirations
nor essential to its character.
While, concededly, racial diversity shares with remedial affirmative
action a consequential increase in racial heterogeneity in classrooms
across the nation, the focus of the diversity rationale is neither retribu-
tive nor restorative. 2' As distinguished from affirmative action programs
and policies, diversity's underlying rationale is pedagogical and its
orientation is prospective; 29 it seeks to achieve an educationally relevant
end. The racial diversity rationale is education policy that contemplates
as its chief aspiration the provision of a learning environment enriched
by the admission of a student body with multifarious experiences."
Within the scope of its importance as a legitimate educational aspira-
tion, diversity distinguishes itself from affirmative action and finds its
independent constitutional footing.3'
27. DavidJ. Trevino, Comment, The Currency of Reparations: Affirmatiie Action in College Admission, 4
SCHOLAR 439 (2002).
28. See Gaston, supra note 8 ("The university is a better place because of both diversity and affi rmiative
action, but they are not the same thing. They are entvined in a symbiotic relationship, but positive actions
to recruit and enroll black students, although they result in a racially diverse student body, stem from unique
origins and their continuation is justified because of ongoing special circumstances.").
29. Race-conscious policies that are prospective in nature have enjoyed the oft-repeated support of
Justice Stevens. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 601 (1990); City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469,511-513 (Stevens,J., concurring in part and concurring injudgment); Wygant v.Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313-15 (Stevens,J., dissenting). I endorse this focus on the future benefit, rather
than the remedial justification, of such decisions. As Professor Levinson observes,
Someone . ..genuinely committed to the positive values of diversity should be far less
interested in the historical explanation for its lack and more committed to assuring a desirable
mix in the future ..... [D]iversity" should not be viewed as a penalty we pay to rectify our
past sins, but, rather, a policy warmly embraced because of its service to the present and
future interests ofthe relevant institutions.
Levinson, supra note 9, at 602 (citing Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins ofDiscrnimination: Ltst Term'sAffirnatizeAction
Cases, 100 HARV. L. REx. 78 (1986)).
30. "[A]s a purely practical matter, relying on diversity rather than discrimination places affirmative
action programs on more solid legal and perhaps political grounds." Michael Selmi, The Book Reiew: The
Facts of Affirmative Action, 85 VA. L. REV. 697, 729 (1999). See also Michelle M. Inouye, Note, The Diersio
jstificationforAffirmatieAction in Higher Education: !sHopwood v. Texas Right?, II NOTRE DANIEJ.L. ETHICS
& PUBLIC POL'Y 385, 388 (1997) ("Diversity has an intrinsic value in the context of higher education not only
for the minority student but for the whole of the student body, and therefore diversity should constitute a
valid justification for a race-based admissions process in the context of higher education.").
31. Comparing diversity to affirmative action, one commentator notes that the former is concerned
with institutions while the latter focuses on certain racial and ethnic groups. He provides the following
example to illustrate the distinction:
The governor of a state that has never had an African-American on its supreme court, and
currently has a supreme court vacancy, is discussing, with his advisors the desirability of
placing an African-American on the court:
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The constitutional salience of diversity depends upon presenting it as
independent of affirmative action programs and policies and in further-
ance of legitimate educational objectives.3 2 Justice Powell's opinion in
support of the diversity rationale conditioned its constitutionality on the
extent to which it served educational prerogatives. Justice Powell made
clear that "educational diversity 3 3 falls within the scope of the First
Amendment freedoms and protections afforded institutions of higher
education. He rejected remedial and social equity based justifications
-inherent to remedial affirmative action-and made the constitutional-
ity of racial diversity-oriented admissions practices entirely dependent
upon their educational relevance.34
One of the most distinguishing features of the diversity rationale is
that its targeted beneficiaries include every student in the classroom, not
merely those students who are members of a racial minority group. The
goal of race-conscious admissions practices premised on the diversity
justification is to enrich the learning experience and the educational
environment for all students, notjust students of color. Justice Thomas's
reference to the racial assignees as the beneficiaries of racial diversity
throughout his dissent in Gnitte3 5 reflects the widely held assumption
that policies and programs promoting racial heterogeneity only serve to
improve the educational experience of students historically excluded
Affirmative Action [Rationale]: "There has never been an Afican-American on our
supreme court, and no wonder. For years, they have been subjected to inferior schooling,
housing and everything else. It's time that we level the playing field. I am appointingJohn
Jones as our first African-American supreme court justice."
Diversity [Rationale]: "Different perspectives are vital to a meaningful collaborative
process on our supreme court. Although not all African-Americans have had identical
backgrounds, there are, in this country, certain experiences that seem to be common to them
and not experienced by Caucasians. Consequently, I believe that the institution of the
judiciary will be better served with an African-American on the court to share his views with
those of the five Caucasians and one Asian-American currently sitting on the court.. Thus,
I am appointingJohn Jones as our first African-American supreme court justice."
Loewy, supra note 7, at 1480-81 (citation omitted). This illustration poignantly depicts the difference between
affirmative action and diversity motivations, despite the fact that in this example and most cases, the result
is the same.
32. "It is important to separate the role of diversity in contributing to the enhancement of the
educational experience from the various other goals that institutions have pursued through racial preferences
in their admissions policies." John Friedl, Making a Compelling Casefor Diversity in College Admissions, 61 U. Prr.
L. REV. 1, 24 (1999).
33. The more accurate phrasing would be "educationally relevant diversity," which is the type of
diversity (including racial diversity) that would serve educational interests.
34. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.v '. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978) '[Tjhe purpose of helping
certain groups whom the faculty ... perceived as victims of 'societal discrimination' does not justify a
classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons like respondent, who bear no responsibility for
whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have suffered.").
35. E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2361 (2003) (Thomas,J., dissenting).
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from the education system. At best, such programs are perceived to
serve a social good, but the assertion that they serve educational
imperatives is viewed with ajaundiced eye.36 Inherent in this skepticism
is the belief that members of racial minority groups would have little to
contribute to educational processes and the intellectual environment
that would be of value, and that the only purpose (though not a constitu-
tionally legitimate purpose) for including these students would be in
compensation for past discrimination. The Supreme Court's reasoning
in Brown v. Board of Education supports this assumption.37
The issue presented to the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education,38 the landmark Supreme Court case in which the Court held
that "separate . . . [is] inherently unequal,"39 was whether the
segregation of children in public schools on the basis of race deprived
minority children of equal educational opportunities. 4 Notably, the
Court did not consider whether segregation adversely impacted the
educational experience of white children. In resolving the issue
presented by Brown, the Court only considered the adverse effect of
segregation on black children and determined that their educational
experience was indeed detrimentally impacted by segregation.4 The
Court's reasoning in Brown makes quite clear that it is the excluded
students of color who suffer segregation's harms. However, implicit in
the Court's determination that separate schools are inherently unequal
is the possibility that white students are harmed by segregation and that
their learning experience and educational environment are enhanced by
integration and, by logical extension, racial heterogeneity.42 It is within
36. See generally L. Damell Weedon, ro, Hopwood, Saying No to Race-Based Affirmative Action is the Right
Thing to Do From an Afrocentric Perspective, 27 CUMB. L. REX. 533 (1997).
37. "It must be remembered that it is not the educational benefit to the minority applicants admitted
under a system of preferences that counts ... . Tojustify minority preferences, the institution must be able
to demonstrate an educational benefit to majority and minority students alike." See Friedl, supra note 32, at
26; see alsoJ. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Thoughts About Pursuing Diversity in Legal Education for Pedagogical Rather than
Political or Compensatoy Reasons: A Review Essay on Stephen L Carter's "Reflection of an Affirmative Action Baby, "36
HOW. LJ. 291, 302 (1993) ("Ihe recruitment of persons from different backgrounds is appropriate, not
for overarching political ends, but for achieving the more modest, but still important objectives of enriching
legal education and making the learning experience more vibrant for both majority and minority
participants.").
38. Brown %'. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
39. Id. at 495.
40. Id. at 493.
41. Id. at 495.
42. Similarly, Sanford Le%inson describes the recognition of the harm that would accrue to white law
students by virtue of the University of Texas's refusal to admit black students, implicit in the Supreme
Court's decision in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), observing,
Iliegal education, practically speaking, demands that students be exposed to the diversity of
groups within the state if they are to be effectively prepared for the various tasks of the
practicing lawyer. Although Vinson[, author of the opinion in Sweatt,] made no argument
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the context of these possibilities that racial diversity finds its constitu-
tional value.
The Grutter majority determined that racial diversity served compel-
ling educational interests without articulating its unique character and
distinctive aims and without clearly identifying the composite means and
ends of the justification. The majority's ad hominen treatment of the
racial diversity rationale failed to establish it unequivocally as an
independently legitimate justification and left it vulnerable to character-
izations by diversity opponents as nothing more than a proxy for
remedial affirmative action programs. As Justice Thomas states,
A close reading of the Court's opinion reveals that all of its legal work
is done through one conclusory statement: The Law School has a
'compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse
student body.' No serious effort is made to explain how these benefits
fit with the state interests the Court has recognized (or rejected) as
compelling.43
III. ASSAYING THE ENDOGENEIC AND EXOGENEIC
ASPECTS OF THE RACE CONCEPT
The second significant error committed by. the Grutter majority was
not addressing the conception of race unique to the racial diversity
rationale, which mirrored the Court's failure to adequately distinguish
between racial diversity and remedial affirmative action. Instead of
acknowledging, examining, and explaining racial diversity's distinct
perspective of race, the majority presumed the relevance of the concep-
tion of race inherent in remedial affirmative action to be uniformly
applicable. This approach reinforced the assumption that, because the
race concept is a predicate for both the racial diversity rationale and the
remedial affirmative action rationale, they both invoke the same
conception of race.44 Grutter provided the Court with the opportunity to
dispel this myth and to address the legal significance of race in the
particular context of racial diversity. How race is conceptualized
that white students were significantly harmed by being deprived of access to the remaining
fifteen percent of the population, it seems impossible to believe that the Court then, or
anyone now, would question the presence of such harm, even if it was, as a practical matter,
far less damaging to white students' future effective ability to practice law. than to African-
American law students deprived of an integrated educational setting.
Levinson, supra note 9, at 575. See also Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 1745, 1749 (1996) ("Integrated education ... does not just benefit minorities--it advantages all
students in a distinctive way .... ")."
43. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2353 (2003) (citation omitted).
44. Book Note, Form Over Substaace, 110 HAR\. L. RE\;. 1645 (1997).
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determines the extent to which racial heterogeneity can be said to serve
educational imperatives. Unfortunately, the majority failed to articulate
this specific concept of race relevant to racial heterogeneity's educa-
tional yield, and the Court's perfunctory consideration of the race
concept produced an awkward, superficial ratification of racial diversity.
Articulating a relevant conception of race is not an academic exercise;
rather, it is crucial to establishing the viable nexus between racial
heterogeneity and educational prerogatives. Showing this connection
requires discussing the race concept according to its endogeneic and
exogeneic traits, as discussed below. Judicious consideration of the two
aspects does not require a determination as to which is the predominant
trait because each aspect is an innate quality of race. The two charac-
teristics are, however, contradistinctive in orientation and derive from
discrepant sources. The nature ofthese fundamental differences informs
the utility of each in sustaining the racial diversity rationale.
The more conventional characterization of race centers on its endo-
geneic aspect, which is concerned with the racial experience from the
perspective of the racial assignee. It describes race in terms of self-
identity and one's internal race consciousness. Responding to the query,
"what does it feel like to be a member of a particular race?" the
endogeneic aspect highlights the internally derived race-consciousness
of the individual. This aspect of race is chameleon-like, entirely
dependent upon the internalizing processes of each member of the race;
therefore, it becomes challenging to discern a collective conception of
what it means to be a member of that race. A uniform consciousness
inherent to a particular race, or a consensus of ideology, perspective, or
identity is difficult to ascertain. 4  Compassionate critics seize upon this
45. The consciousness that defines a particular race is multifarious and difficult to define.
Furthermore, the consideration of race as indicative of diverse experiences. is challenged by opponents of
affirmative action for want of a limiting principle. How are institutions to determine which racial and ethnic
categories merit heightened solicitude? For an in-depth discussion of these challenges to the feasibility of
considering race to promote educational diversity, see Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate Over Affirmative
Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 893, 931 (1994). In response to these challenges, I encourage that universities, in
differentiating between racial and ethnic classifications which promote educational diversity and those that
do so to a lesser extent, consider whether a particular race or ethnicity has an "indigenous diverse element."
This concept allows the university to make its decision based on a determination of whether a racial or ethnic
classification was created, recognized, or used by the govemment to shape the social, economic, and political
realities of its membership. It is those racial and ethnic groups, whose membership has experienced a distinct
reality shaped by government policies and legislation and the history and tradition of this nation, that should
be recognized as having a unique experience that serves educational prerogatives.
It is important to note that,
Although the United States has become an increasingly diverse society, Americans of
different racial and ethnic groups lead remarkably separate lives. They live in separate
neighborhoods and attend separate schools. They are unlikely to have any sustained or
serious contact with each other and rarely share either the significant events in their lives,
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difficulty as the quintessential failing of the racial diversity justification,
as the following Hopwood excerpt illustrates:
The use of race, in and of itself, to choose students simply achieves a
student body that looks different. Such a criterion is no more rational
on its own terms than would be choices based upon the physical size
or blood type of applicants . . . . The assumption is that a certain
individual possesses characteristics by virtue of being a member of a
certain racial group. This assumption, however, does not withstand
scrutiny. "The use of a racial characteristic to establish a presumption
that the individual also possesses other, and socially relevant, charac-
teristics, exemplifies, encourages, and legitimizes the mode of thought
and behavior that underlies most prejudice and bigotry in modem
America." To believe that a person's race controls his point of view
is to stereotype him ...... "Social scientists may debate how peoples'
thoughts and behavior reflect their background, but the Constitution
provides that the government may not allocate benefits or burdens
among individuals based on the assumption that race or ethnicity
determines how they act or think." 6
Several deficiencies are 'inherent to this critique of racial diversity,47
such as weddings and funerals, or the more casual aspects of their daily routines, like
shopping trips or parent-teacher nights. Race affects one's experiences-and therefore one's
perspectives and beliefs.
Expert Report, 7he CompellingAeed for Diersity in Higher Education, 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. 241, 245 (1999).
46. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945-46 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Richard A. Posner, The DeFmis
Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 12 (1974); NIetro
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). O'Connor's statement in Metro
Broadcasting, where the issue presented to the Court was whether there was a constitutionally compelling need
to create and promote diversity in the media context, was entirely concerned with the nature of viewpoints
expressed by broadcasters. Diversity of viewpoint is neither the primary concern nor the chief aim of
educational diversity; rather, it is the experience that racially diverse students contribute to the analysis of
ideas, regardless of their viewpoint, that is of importance. Hence, the rejection of the diversity argument in
Justice O'Connor's dissent should not be interpreted as a prohibition of the consideration of race in the
education context.
47. Consider the Court's treatment of the essentialist argument in Metro Broadcasting where it stated,
The judgment that there is a link between expanded minority ownership and broadcast'
diversity does not rest on impermissible stereotyping. Congressional policy does not assume
that in every case minority ownership and management will lead to more minority-oriented
programming or to the expression of a discreet "minority viewpoint" on the airwaves.
Neither does it pretend that all programming that appeals to minority audiences can be
labeled "minority programming" or that programming that might be described as "minority"
does not appeal to ronminorities. Rather, both Congress and the FCC maintain simply that
expanded minority ownership of broadcast outlets will, in the aggregate, result in greater
broadcast diversity. A broadcasting industry with representative minority participation will
produce more variation and diversity than will one whose ownership is drawn from a single
racially and ethnically homogeneous group. The predictivejudgment about the overall result
of minority entry into broadcasting is not a rigid assumption about how minority owners will
behave in every case but rather is akin tojustice Powell's conclusion in Bakke that greater
admission of minorities would contribute, on average, "to the robust exchange of ideas."
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but its chief oversight is that it makes no distinction between perspective
and experience.48 An appreciation for the differences between the two
parallels the critical difference between the endogeneic and exogeneic
aspects of race. Perspective, which is intrinsically subjective, is the
predominant characteristic of the endogeneic aspect of the race concept,
whereas experience, which is intrinsically objective, is the predominant
characteristic of the exogeneic aspect.49 Hence, one's racial classifica-
tion may not determine one's behavior or thoughts and may negligibly
inform a person's perspective or viewpoint. But to say that one's racial
classification does not determine one's experience ignores this nation's
long and impassioned relationship with race and how an individual's
racial classification continues to define one's social, political, and
economic reality.
While it is true that every Black American may not have the same
perspective of their blackness and may not hold viewpoints that differ in
perspective from White Americans, they have, undoubtedly, had the
experience of being Black in America, which affords a distinct reality,
that White Americans can neither approximate nor experience.5' The
racialized experience is meaningful not because it is informed by one's
consciousness of it; rather, it is meaningful because it is shaped by
extrinsic forces that result in a constructed political, social, and
economic reality.51 This anti-existentialist conception of race reveals that
Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 579 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978)).
48. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989) (emphasizing, "[the]
danger that a racial classification is merely the product of unthinking stereotypes or a form of racial politics");
Selmi, supra note 28, at 730 n. 157 ("This is not to suggest that increasing racial diversity in a student body
will not have the effect ofintroducing different views and perspectives; it often will. But the policies are not
structured in a way to ensure that kind of diversity, as race is generally used as a broad proxy that will not
necessarily produce diverse viewpoints."); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (rejecting racial
redistricting on the basis that it "reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group.., think
alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls"); see also Sheila
Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of Diversity, 1993 WIs. L. REV'. 105 (1993).
49. To be sure, the endogeneic and exogeneic aspects of race do not function independently of one
another. The internal apperception of one's racial identity is often informed and constructed by the
correlating exogeneic racial experience. Those having experienced a distinct reality discernibly different
from that encountered by the racial majority develop a particularized self-awareness, which is substantially
informed by their racialized experiences. This is not to say that absent the unique experience created by a
racialized reality one would have no consciousness of one's membership in a particular race; however, it is
likely that such associations would have significantly diminished political, social, and economic importance
and would therefore be of minimal educational import.
50. "[W hatever one's opinions and beliefs may be, they are affected by one's experience-including
the experience, for example, of being black, or of being white." Expert Report, supra note 45, at 248.
51. As Michelle M. Inouye notes, "[Diversity] assume[s] the reality-no less a reality because it is
socially constructed-that people of different races and ethnicities often have different life experiences."
Inouye, supra note 30, at 413-14; see also THE CORRESPONDENTs OF THE NEw YORK TIMES, HOW RACE
is LIVED IN AMERICA: PULUNG TOGETHER, PULLING APART (2001); Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige,
Affirmative Actionfor I Vhom?, 47 STAN. L. REv. 855, 862 (1995).
990
THE DIVERSITYDICHOTOMY
racial heterogeneity contributes to the education environment a racial
experience different from the reality experienced by the majority,
regardless of the extent to which the racial experience yields viewpoints
that differ from those of the majority. It is the distinctive character of
the racial experience, which enhances the learning environment for
every student at the university.52 The Law School was not, as essen-
tialists allege, concerned with the diversity of views expressed; they were
concerned with diversity among the experiences of those expressing
views.53
The essentialist objection to affirmative action is preoccupied with the
endogeneic aspect of race. This approach relegates race to a purely
descriptive designation, without regard for its attendant exposures and
experiences. The consignment of race to a mere phenotypical-based
demographic prompted Justice Thomas in his dissent in Grutter to treat
race as an "aesthetic" 54 or a visceral sensitivity rather than as representa-
tive of an objectively discernible experiential reality. It is the latter
construction of race, featuring its exogeneic component, upon which the
racial diversity rationale is premised.
The exogeneic characteristic of race-or race as social, political, and
economic construct-is premised upon an acknowledgement of an
objectively discernible and verifiable experience that results from
assigned membership in a racial group, independent of and notwith-
standing perspective, viewpoint, or opinion about racial identity.
According to the exogeneic aspect of race, the character of the race
concept is defined principally by an external and objectively measurable
set of realities imposed according to societal assignment of racial
identity.5" Before one can accurately ascertain the educational relevance
52. "[I]f scholarly excellence were the sole or even predominant criterion, Harvard College would
lose a great deal of its vitality and intellectual excellence and ... the quality of the educational experience
offered to all students would suffer." Appendix to Opinion ofPowsell, Bake, 438 U.S. at 321 (No. 76-811).
53. "In deciding whom to include in an affirmative action program, a law school might appropriately
consider the salience of the group in contemporary American society or in the geographic region in which its
graduates tend to practice. Among the determinants of a group's salience are its numerical size and the
extent to which its culture differs from the dominant culture of students attending the school." Brest &
Oshige, supra note 51, at 873.
54. Grutterv. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2353 (2003) (ThomasJ., dissenting) ("A distinction between
these two ideas (unique educational benefits based on racial aesthetics and race for its own sake) is purely
sophistic-so much so that the majority uses them interchangeably.").
55. Neil Gotanda provides an eloquent explanation of how this exogenous conception of race comes
into conflict with the concept of colorblindness. He says,
To use color-blind nonrecognition effectively in the private sphere, we would have to fail to
recognize race in our everyday lives. This is impossible. One cannot literally follow a color-
blind standard of conduct in ordinary social life. Moreover, the technique of nonrecognition
ultimately supports the supremacy of white interests.
In everyday American life, nonrecognition is self-contradictory because it is impossible
2004]
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of racial heterogeneity and the extent to which it serves a compelling
interest, it is imperative to understand the race concept according to its
exogeneic trait. The recognition of the discernible set of racialized
social, economic, and political exposures, in turn, creates a distinct
reality demonstrably different from that experienced by the racial
majority. The dissimilarity between the experiences of members of the
racial majority and the experiences of members of the racial minority
(not the internal musings of racial assignees) generates the intellectual
synergy essential to higher-order thinking and analytic learning. The
invocation of the racial experience as a valuable construct requires a
shift in consciousness from regarding it as something to be reconciled to
an appreciation of the racial experience as representative of distinct
experiences that have educational relevance.
The value that the exogeneic characteristic of race assigns to the
experience of racial minorities is not premised upon a characterization
of the racialized experience as good or bad or something to be atoned
for; rather, it pertains only to the extent to which the experience of
racial minorities differs from that of members of the racial majority.
The racial diversity rationale does not attempt to use past and present
racial discrimination to justify measures to expiate the resulting harm;
rather, race-based discrimination is paradigmatic of race as a social,
political, and economic construction. The educationally relevant aspect
of the exogeneic character of race lies in the existence of a different
experience and not how individuals internally respond to differential
treatment on the basis of their racial caste. To the extent that race
derives its significance from the realities that define it, racial discrimina-
tion reflects and confirms the breadth, depth, and distinctive quality of
the racial experience. 6
to not think about a subject without having first thought about it at least a little.
Nonrecognition differs from nonperception. Compare color-blind nonrecognition with
medical color-blindness. A medically color-blind person is someone who cannot see what
others can. It is a partial nonperception of what is "really" there. To be racially color-blind,
on the other hand, is to ignore what one has already noticed. The medically color-blind
individual never perceives color in the first place; the racially color-blind individual perceives
race and then ignores it. This is not just a semantic distinction. The characteristics of race
that are noticed (before being ignored) arc situated within an already existing understanding
of race. That is, race carries with it a complex social meaning. The proponents of color-
blind nonrecognition do not acknowledge this aspect of racial consciousness when they
describe their "neutral" decisionmaking processes.
Neil Gotanda, A Critique of"Our Constitution is Color-Blind" 44 STAN. L. REV. I, 18-19 (1991).
56. "The limits of the diversity rationale also explain why it is impossible to avoid bringing
discrimination into the affirmative action equation. The primary reason why race can be distinguished from
a host of other diversity enhancing programs is our legacy of discrimination and governmentally sanctioned
animus toward African-Americans." Selmi, supra note 30, at 732.
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The Grutter majority's relative silence on the issue of race spoke
volumes. The dearth of analysis on the topic that lay at the heart of the
rationale that the majority ultimately deemed constitutional can best be
characterized as a schizophrenic vacillation between an endogeneic-
oriented and an exogeneic-oriented formulation of the race concept.
On one hand, the majority emphasized, "The Law School does not
premise its need for critical mass on 'any belief that minority students
always (or even consistently) express some characteristic minority
viewpoint on any issue."' 57  Then the Court contradicted that point,
observing, 'Just as growing up in a particular region or having particu-
lar professional experiences is likely to affect an individual's views, so too
is one's own unique experience of being a racial minority in a society,
like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters."58 The majority's
latter statement on race fails to distinguish between viewpoint (an
endogeneic characteristic) and experience (an exogeneic characteristic).
Despite the majority's weak acknowledgement of the significance of
race, which was qualified by equating race, geographic origins, and
professional affiliations, it failed to make plain that the salience of race
derives from the existence of the color line that still operates to create
divergent experiences for those on both sides of it.59
The exogeneic aspect insists upon an acknowledgment of the
existence of the color line, which W.E.B. DuBois described as presenting
57. Gutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
58. Id. The majority also observed, "By virtue of our Nation's struggle with racial inequality, such
students are ... likely to have experiences of particular importance to the Law School's mission." Id. at
2344. "In light of our history and the persistence of racial separation, it is not surprising that race remains
a defining characteristic of American life. Even in a world of racial equality, the educational imperative that
Justice Powell identified in Bakke would exist as long as one's race was so prominent a part of one's
experience. This is not to say, of course, that members of any racial group are somehow preordained to hold
some particular set of opinions or beliefs." Expert Report, supra note 45, at 248.
"[\] hatever one's opinions and beliefs may be, they are affected by one's experience-including
the experience, for example, of being black, or of being white." Id.
59. AsJustice Ginsburg insightfully observed in her dissent inAdarand,
[Discriminatory] effects, reflective of a system of racial caste only recently ended, are evident
in our workplaces, markets, and neighborhoods. Job applicants with identical resume,
qualifications, and interview styles still experience different receptions, depending on their
race. White and African-American consumers still encounter different deals. Peopleofcolor
looking for housing still face discriminatory treatment by landlords, real estate agents, and
mortgage lenders. Minority entrepreneurs sometimes fail to gain contracts though they are
the low bidders, and they are sometimes refused work even after winning contracts. Bias
both conscious and unconscious, reflecting traditional and unexamined habits of thought,
keeps up barriers that must come down ifequal opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever
genuinely to become this country's law and practice.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 273-274 (1995) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
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the definitive challenge of the twentieth century.6" The color line is not
the chimerical conception of those that the line was drawn to exclude.
This racial demarcation owes its genesis to slavery and its entrenchment
to the slave codes, post-emancipation Jim Crow laws, government
mandated and enforced segregation, and to the invisible but efficacious
hand of de facto discrimination. And yet, unlike the remedial affirma-
tive action rationale, the diversity justification seeks neither to erase the
color line nor to compensate for its existence. The diversity approach
merely acknowledges the color line as emblematic of significantly
divergent, educationally relevant, social, political, and economic
realities, and seeks to utilize the disparity created by the color line to
greatly improve the educational experience for every student in the
classroom.
A. The Constitutional Contours of the Color Line
Though racial classifications and the experiences unique to them
certainly pre-date slavery, the legalized economic and political disen-
franchisement of tens of thousands of U.S. born residents for more than
two hundred years provides a sufficient starting point for an examina-
tion of the historic external indicators of a distinct racial experience.
The enslavement of persons based on their assigned racial classification
served to provide slaves with unique experiences and to amplify the
disparity between their economic, social, and political reality and the
reality experienced by those free from the oppressive hand of servitude.
For more than two hundred years, slavery shaped the economic, social,
and political experiences of the enslaved. The institution operated
without regard for any internal concept of racial identity or the race
consciousness of the enslaved; race was characterized only in terms of
whether one was legally entitled to one's own labor and personal,
economic, and political freedom.
The text of the United States Constitution provides another historical
example of the controlling nature of the exogeneic aspect of race.
Classifications explicitly dividing racial minorities from the racial
majority appear in the original text of this nation's founding document,
which excludes Native Americans"' from representational rights and tax
obligations and which characterizes blacks as constituting three-fifths of
a person.62 The inclusion and utilization of racial classifications to
60. DuBois, supra note 4.
61, Though the actual text of the Constitution refers to "Indians," the correct name for this racial
classification is "Native American."
62. "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be
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expressly proscribe the political reality of Native Americans and Black
Americans provides another striking external indicator of a unique
racial experience. Critics of racial diversity, who characterize the exo-
geneic conception of race as a contemporary and equivocal convention,
are reluctant to admit that this nation's founding document created the
experiential difference between racial minorities and the racial majority.
The discernible experiential differences are not the opus of the racial
assignee; rather, they are by constitutional design.
The Dred Scott case illustrates the Supreme Court's consideration of
the race concept exclusively according to its exogeneic aspect in deter-
mining the circumference of the constitutionally proscribed experience
of Blacks born in America. In Dred Scott, the consciousness of the
plaintiff in error inspired him to pursue a claim that he was entitled to
be emancipated and entitled to relief for injuries resulting from an
alleged assault by a white man on his person and against his wife and
children. The conception of race utilized by the Supreme Court to
reject Dred Scott claim was premised exclusively on a consideration of the
difference between the rights, privileges, and protections assigned by the
Constitution to blacks in America and those accorded to members of the
racial majority. The Court opined in pertinent part:
The provision in the Articles of Confederation was, "that the free
inhabitants of each of the States, . . . should be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States" .....
[N] otwithstanding the generality of the words 'free inhabitants," it is
very clear that, according to their accepted meaning in that day, they
did not include the African race, whether free or not .... Words could
hardly have been used which more strongly mark the line of distinc-
tion between the citizen and the subject; the free and the subjugated
races .... And it cannot for a moment be supposed, that a class of
persons thus separated and rejected from those who formed the
sovereignty of the States, were yet intended to be included under the
words "free inhabitants." 64
included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to
the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding
Indians not taxed, threefflhs of all other Persons." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added). Though this
section of the Constitution has been modified by the Fifteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XV, it is
of symbolic significance that the original language creating the racial classification remains in the document.
63. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), superceded by ConstitutionalAmendment as stated in Oliver
v. Duncan, 293 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Mr. Scott was considered an erroneous plaintiff because the
Court ultimately determined that a Black man did not have the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the U.S.
courts to resolve a dispute. Id.
64. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 418-19.
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The Court's recognition of the "line of distinction" as a constitutional
invention clearly embraces the exogeneic aspect of race, without regard
for its endogeneic component. The Dred Scott decision and underlying
reasoning is premised upon a conception of race as a social, political,
and economic designation, without regard for the consciousness of the
racial designee. Inherent to this reasoning is an appreciation for the
difference between the experiences and exposures of the racial minority
and that of the racial majority.
It is axiomatic that the passage of the Civil War Amendments,6 5
particularly the Equal Protection Clause, was motivated by a desire to
mitigate the disparity between the political and economic realities 6
experienced by racial minorities and members of the racial majority.
While the Amendments achieved this goal to some degree, they did not
disestablish the race-based demarcation originating with slavery that was
reinforced by the Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,67 where
the Court affirmed that the color line was defined and diuturnal and
confirmed this nation's adherence to a constructed, racialized experien-
tial differential.
The Supreme Court in Plessy expressly rejected an exogeneic
conception of race, while simultaneously enforcing divergent racialized
realities for those on both sides of the color line. The "separate" aspect
of the pre-eminent "separate but equal" apologue established categori-
cally that the races experienced different realities.68 The Plessy Court
was charged with determining whether the divergent nature of those
experiences produced inequality in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. By characterizing the Louisiana law at issue, which required
separate railroad accommodations based on the race of the passenger,
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII-XV. The Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides
in pertinent part, "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction." The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in pertinent part, "All persons
bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to thejurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein the) reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; not shall any, State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." The Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in pertinent part, "The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
66. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1873) (chronicling the historical background of
the Civil War Amendments and noting that their underlying purpose was to obtain "freedom, and the
protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised
unlimited dominion over him").
67. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
68. Emmanuel 0. Iheukwumere & Philip C. Aka, Te VII, Affirmative Action, and the March Toward
Color-Blindjurisprudence, II TEMP. POL. & CiV. RTs. L. REV. 1, 18 (2001).
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as a social proscription and therefore beyond the reach of the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court was able to dispense with any meaningful
consideration of the substantive differences between the experiences of
members of different races. By endorsing the controlling doctrine of
fictitious equality, the Court was able to assuage its conscience (and that
of the nation) and firmly fix the delineation between the experiences of
racial minorities and members of the racial majority, without conceding
that the differences were of political, social, or economic import.69
The Court's response to the argument that a law relegating members
of a certain race to utilize facilities offering substandard provisions,
affixes to those persons a "badge of inferiority," reveals the Court's
reluctance to acknowledge the exogeneic aspect of race as constitution-
ally relevant. It considered the depicton of the experiential differential
between racial minorities and the racial majority as asymmetrical, to be
a meaningless construction that racial minorities chose to assign to it.y°
By characterizing the complaint of the subjugated races as gratuitous
and deeming the demarcation between the races to be benign, the Court
ensured that members of the racial majority and the racial minority
would continue to experience markedly different economic, political,
and social realities, while divesting the divergent realities of any
significance. Thus, the dissimilar nature of the two sets of racialized
experiences was discounted but the color line that created them was
firmly entrenched.
The nation would have to wait fifty-eight years for the Supreme
Court's ruling in Brown,7 in which the Court acknowledged the
divergent nature of the racialized realities forged by the color line and
characterized the existence of the racial divide as an inequity. There
were, however, several cases in the interim in which the Court was
willing to acknowledge what it was reluctant to consider in Plessy-that
there were discernible indicia reflective of a substantive difference
between the realities of those falling on opposite sides of the color line.72
In these cases the Court focused on the exogeneic aspect of race and
69. Jen-L A. Wong, Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena: A Color-blind Remedy Eliminating Racial
Preferences, 18 HAWAI L. REV. 939 (1996).
70. PLessy, 163 U.S. at 371 ("We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist
in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of
inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it.").
71. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483(1934).
72. Berea Coll. v. Kent, 211 U.S 43 (1908); Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S.
528 (1899); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); Missouri ex rel. Gaines %. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938);
Sipuel %. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1938); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339
U.S. 637 (1950).
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endeavored to ascertain and approximate the amplitude of the disparity
between the Black experience and the White experience.7" And then
there was Brown, which is often regarded as emblematic of the success
of the Civil Rights Movement.
The most celebrated aspect of the Brown decision is the Court's focus
on the endogeneic aspect of race. The Court's reliance on the social
science evidence supporting the conclusion that separate schooling
"generates [among Blacks] a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever
to be undone" reveals the Court's concern for the race consciousness of
racial assignees.74 Anotherjustification for the Court's decision in Brown
was its appreciation of the race concept according to its exogeneic
characteristic. Implicit in the Supreme Court's decision in Brown, which
attempted to mute the significance of the color line, if not eliminate it,
is an acknowledgement of the delineation and the experiential differen-
tial it manufactured.
While Brown certainly may be said to have precipitated the elimina-
tion of formal adherence to the separatist mandate of the color line in
this society, that lineation continues to. exist and reflect a discernible
divide between the economic, social, and political realities of racial
minorities and those experienced by the racial majority. Despite its
enduring nature, racial discrimination remains a contemporary reality.
Present-day examples confirming its existence abound. Racial-profil-76 "n7777
ing,15 redlining," residential segregation, 77 segregation in education,"
environmental racism, 79 discriminatory immigration practices, 80 employ-
ment discrimination,8' and prosecutorial and sentencing disparities82 all
affirm that for people of color race is relevant to, if not determinative of,
73. See generally cases cited supra note 72.
74. Brown, 347 U.S. at 484.
75. Katheryn K. Russell, Racial Prqfiling A Status Report of the Lega4 Legislative and Empirical Literature,
3 RUTGERS RACE& L. REV. 61 (2001).
76. Charles L. Nier" III, Perpetuation of Segregation: Toward a .ke Historical and Legal Interpretation of
Redlining Under the Fair Housing Act, 32J. MARSHALL L. REV. 617 (1999).
77. Nancy A.' Denton, The Role of Residential Segregation in Promoting and Maintaining Inequality in Wealth
and Property, 34 IND. L. REV. 1199 (2001).
78. Bari A. Orlow, Note, Fifty YearsAfier Brown v. Board of Education: Resegregation ofAmerica's Public
Schools, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP.J. 183 (2002).
79. Musa Keenheel, Lowering the Bar: The .Aedfor .A'w L gislation and liberalization of Current Laws to
Combat Environmental Racism, 20 TEMP. EN\TL. L. & TECH.J. 105 (2001).
80. George A. Martinez, Race and Immigration Law: A Paradigm Shifl?, 2000 U. ILL. L. REN7. 517 (2000).
81. Robert Belton; Mv ed-Motive Cases in Employment Law Discrimination Reisited- A Brief Updated View
of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. RE\V. 651 (2001).
82. Sharon L. Davies, ThekeData. Over-Representation ofMinorities in the Criminalyustice System, 66 LAW
& CoNrEMP. PROBS. 17 (2003).
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the quality and character of their lives.8 3 It bears reiterating that the
acknowledgement ofpresent-day racial discrimination as relevant to the
diversity rationale is not antithetical to its status as-a justification inde-
pendent from remedial affirmation action.. The key distinguishing
feature between the two is that the racial diversity rationale does not
seek to equalize the experiences of blacks and whites; rather, it
highlights and utilizes the ways in which the experiences differ.
B. Turning a Blind Eye to the Color Line: A Limiting Principle for the Racial
Diversiy Rationale
The Supreme Court's decision in Plessy added to constitutional lore
Justice Harlan's often-cited statement about the color-blind character of
the Constitution.84 In his dissent in Grutter, Justice Thomas invoked
Justice Harlan's characterization of the Constitution and admonished
the majority for "placing its imprimatur on a practice that can only
weaken the principle of equality embodied in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence.and the Equal Protection Clause. 83 This perspective views
homogeneity as. a prerequisite for equality and, by logical extension,
regards heterogeneity as the antithesis of equality.8'
The color-blind interpretation of the Constitution derives from this
presumed norm of racial homogeneity, and assigns to the Equal Protec-
tion Clause the role and responsibility of protecting and ensuring
adherence to that norm. It also emasculates the concept of race
according to its exogeneic trait, depriving it. of any significance.
Ultimately the color-blind delusion confuses aspiration with reality by
denying the existence of the color line and deems any consideration of
the differences between the racial experiences that the color line creates
as contravening the Equal Protection Clause's commitment to
equality.87 In doing so, it positions the Equal Protection Clause as
83. NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, THE STATE OF BLACK A.MERICA 2003 (2003).
84. "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neitherknows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,559 (1896) (Harlan,J., dissenting).
85. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2365 (2003) (ThomasJ, dissenting).
86. Color-blind advocates' obsession with this principle is unjustifiably optimistic and undeniably
premature. See Reva B. Siegel, Discriminatin in the Eyes of the Law: How "Color-Blindness" Discourse Disrupts and
Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77, 84 (2000) (citing Reva B. Siegel, In the Eyes of the Law
Reflections on the Authority of Legal Discourse, in LAW STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC INTHELmW at 225,
227 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) ("The blindness trope is, as I have argued, no less a legal fiction
than the doctrine of marital unity or the concept of equality in the eyes of the law.")).
87, In a society still plagued by racism, the current surge of support for legally imposed
colorblindness is problematic . ... [It] ignores" the ever present issues surrounding American
race relations .... In August, 1997, Brooklyn New York was witness to a horrific incident
of police brutality. The incident involved white police officers, who, while yelling racial
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diametrically opposed to the racial diversity rationale because the
rationale values and promotes heterogeneity. The Grutter majority's
silence on the issue of race and its failure to articulate and discuss the
racial experience according to its exogeneic trait makes the diversity
justification vulnerable to the color-blind tautology.
While the color-blind ideal views disregarding the existence of the
color line as essential to achieving equality, the egalitarianism to which
it aspires can only be achieved by first acknowledging and then
eliminating the disparity created by the color line. Had the Grutter
majority acknowledged the existence of the color line and properly
defined the character and aims of the diversity rationale according to
the exogeneic aspect of race, it could have utilized the natural expiration
date inherent to the justification. Instead, the majority was anxious to
establish a limiting principle to augment the capricious analysis it
provided in support of its holding. Thus, it arbitrarily seized upon a
twenty-five-year sunset provision to "assure[ ] all citizens that the
deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic
groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the goal
of equality."88
The majority's analysis and in particular its allusion to the "goal of
equality" echoes the flawed logic inherent to the color-blind ideal and
reflects the majority's reluctance to distinguish between remedial affir-
mative action, which is concerned with equality, and the racial diversity
rationale, which is decidedly not. Erroneously articulating equality as
the racial diversity rationale's aspiration enabled the majority to provide
at least some justification for the presage that prompted the announce-
ment of the twenty-five-year sunset provision. If the majority had
accurately described the aim of the rationale in terms of its educational
relevance, it would have been unable to provide even this unconvincing
justification for the sunset provision.
The majority's refusal to consider the conception of race relevant to
racial diversity, despite its centrality to the case, resulted in its failure to
take advantage of the rationale's natural timetable. The educational
epithets, sav'agely beat Haitian immigrant Abner Louima. Such an incident is only the most
recent example of American society's failure to achieve the goals of Title VII and failure to
mov'e towards a truly colorblind society. Furthermore, incidents such as this point to the
reality that while the concept of a colorblind American society is laudable, there is still a real
need for emphasis on nurturing diversity in our neighborhoods, workplace and, most
importantly, educational institutions.
Matthew S. Lerner, Comment, lkn hDizersiy!LeadstoAdersi': 7he Princples ofPromoting Diversity n Educational
Institutions, Premonitions of the Taxman v. Board of Education Settlement, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1035, 1062-1064
(1999).
88. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2346 (2003).
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relevance of the racial experience is dependent upon the existence of the
divergent racial realities experienced by those falling on opposite sides
of the color line. When racial assignees no longer experience disparate
social, economic, and political realities, they will no longer contribute a
sufficiently divergent experience to the educational environment. Thus,
the rationale will no longer be educationally viable. The rationale's
relevance is not contingent upon considerations of equality; rather, it is
focused on the extent to which the color line continues to create dispar-
ate, racialized experiences that produce educational benefits. The
majority's optimistic projection that twenty-five years from now racial
discrimination will have subsided to such an extent that racial minorities
will no longer have a distinct experience in America is little more than
a vain hope. Given that the color line has survived as a defining
characteristic of this nation for the past four hundred years, it is not
likely to dissipate in the next twenty-five.89
An additional adverse consequence of the majority's failure to define
the character and contours of the aspectof race relevant to the diversity
rationale is the Gratz majority's determination that the University of
Michigan's undergraduate admissions practice was unconstitutional.
The Grutter majority refused to acknowledge the existence of a definitive,
objectively discernible racial experience with significant educational
dividends. This approach enabled the Gratz majority to characterize the
undergraduate admissions practice of according minority applicants an
automatic twenty points out of a possible one hundred points as a quota,
rather than as an appropriate means of achieving the educational
benefits that derive from the continuing existence of a divergent racial
experience in America
The acknowledgment of race according to its exogeneic aspect is
steeped in constitutional precedence. A historical survey of the Supreme
Court's consideration and conception of race in its Dred Scott, Plessy, and
Brown decisions provides sufficient support for recognition of the
significance of the race concept's exogeneic trait. The majority should
have conducted a thorough examination of race and an acknowledg-
ment of the color line that creates the educationally relevant experiential
differential. The majority's failure to articulate the conception of race
inherent to the racial diversity rationale divested its endorsement of the
justification of legal legitimacy and cast it in the light of a political
concession.
89. Id. at 2348 ("From today's vantage point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the
next generation's span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make it safe
to sunset affirmative action.") (GinsburgJ., concurring).
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IV. A QUALIFIED ENDORSEMENT OF RACIAL HETEROGENEITY'S
EDUCATIONAL DIVIDENDS
The Grutter majority's third significant error was its peremptory
acknowledgment of racial diversity's educational yield. Despite the
mountain of credible evidence presented by the Law School in defense
of its assertion that there is an appreciable nexus between racial diversity
and learning outcomes, the majority summarily certified racial heteroge-
neity's educational relevance. The majority's failure to provide a
thoughtful explanation of its determination undermined the integrity of
its judgment. Though the majority described the educational benefits
of racial heterogeneity as "substantial,"9 referenced the many expert
reports and studies documenting racial diversity's educational yield,9"
and cited the numerous amid who bolstered the Law School's chief
assertion,92 it conducted no examination of its own. The majority
accorded absolute deference to the Law School's opinion and con-
cluded, "The Law School has determined, based on its experience and
expertise, that a 'critical mass' of underrepresented minorities is
necessary to further its compelling interest in securing the educational
benefits of a diverse student body."93
The majority's determination that this issue falls squarely within the
scope of the University's authority to make academic decisions is
correct, but, asJustices Rehnquist,94 Kennedy,95 and Thomas96 observe,
it does not relieve the majority of the responsibility of conducting an
exacting inquiry into the legitimacy of the Law School's assertion. The
majority did not, as several dissentingJustices allege, fail to apply strict
scrutiny to the diversity rationale; however, its failure to publish the
reasoning behind its holding that the rationale survived constitutional
90. Id. at 2339.
91. Id. at 2340. The Giulter majority recognizes the following studies: VVILLIAMG.BOWEN&DAREK
BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER (1998); DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (G. Orfield & M. Kurlaender eds., 2001); COMPELLING INTEREST: EXAMINING
EVIDENCE ON RACIAL DYNAMICS IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (MitchellJ. Chang et al. eds., 2003).
Gnater, 123 S. Ct. at 2340.
92. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
93. Id. at 2341.
94. Id. at 2366 ("Although the Court recites the language ofour strict scrutiny analysis, its application
of that review is unprecedented in its deference.") (Kennedy,J, dissenting).
95. Id. at 2371 ("The majority today refuses to be faithful to the settled principle ofstrict review ....
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
96. Id. at 2356 ("The Court bases its unprecedented deference to the Law School-a deference
antithetical to strict scrutiny-on an idea of 'educational autonomy' grounded in the First Amendment.")
(Thomas,J, dissenting).
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scrutiny invites criticism and arouses suspicion as to whether some
deficiency inherent to the rationale motivated the majority to conduct
its searching inquiry in secret. The majority's refusal to assert a
proprietary interest over the determination that racial diversity serves a
constitutionally compelling interest is disturbing and renders the
precedential value of its determination equivocal.
Rather than disclose the details of the nature and findings of its
examination of the racial diversity rationale, the majority proclaimed,
Today, we hold that the Law School has a compelling interest in
attaining a diverse student body.
The Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is
essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer. The Law
School's assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield educational
benefits is substantiated by respondents and their amici. Our scrutiny
of the interest asserted by the Law Schoolis no less strict for taking
into account complex educational judgments in an area that lies
primarily within the expertise of the university. Our holding today is
in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a
university's academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed
limits .... Our conclusion that. the Law School has a compelling
interest in a diverse student body is informed by our view that
attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School's
proper institutional mission, and that "good faith" on the part of a
university is "presumed" absent "a showing to the contrary." '
It was not enough for the :majority to say, "I]he Law School's
admissions policy promotes 'cross-racial understanding,' helps to break
down racial stereotypes, and 'enables [students] to better understand
persons of different races."' 98 Nor was it sufficient for the majority to
describe the benefits of racial diversity as important because they make
"'classroom discussion . . . livelier, more spirited and, simply more
enlightening and interesting' when the students have 'the greatest
possible variety of backgrounds."'9 9 This diaphanous description of
diversity's educational yield is devoid of any acknowledgment of racial
heterogeneity's intellectual attributes The majority's failure to
articulate the more substantive benefits that racial diversity affords,
particularly when it was provided with a wealth of credible evidence in
that regard, raises a question as to whether the majority sincerely
believed that racial diversity is relevant to cognitive processes.
97. Id. at 2339 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-319 (1978)).
98. l at 2339-40 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 874 (E.D. Mich. 2001)).
99. Id. at 2340.
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Educational relevance is generally determined according to the extent
to which intellectual imperatives are served. Though the Law School
defines its educational goals broadly to also include democratic
outcomes and the benefits that relate to living and working in a diverse
society, the majority's emphasis on these interests, 00 rather than the
diversity rationale's phrenic aspirations, diminishes the force of the
rationale's assertion of educational relevance.'' The two educational
interests highlighted by the majority are much more vulnerable than
learning outcomes to be characterized as remedial-based and social-
equity-based justifications, which Justice Powell deemed unconstitu-
tional in Bakke. 02
The majority's rationale provided no limiting principle for the
deference it afforded the Law School's assertion that racial diversity was
educationally relevant. Hence, there is no safeguard to prevent an
educational institution from asserting that it is racial homogeneity that
serves educational prerogatives. In the interests of uniformity and
consistency of the law it would seem that the Grutter decision would
dictate that absolute deference be accorded to that assertion as well.
The only way that the majority could have avoided presenting academic
freedom as a sword or a shield, depending upon the institution wielding
it, was to recognize racial heterogeneity's educational relevance as an
evidentiary matter and not as a matter of deferential consideration.
100. The majority states,
We have repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance of preparing students for work
and citizenship, describing education as pivotal to "sustaining our political and cultural
heritage" with a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of society. This Court has long
recognized that "education.. . is the very foundation of good citizenship." For this reason,
the diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public institutions of higher education
must be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity... . Effective participation
by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the
dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.
Moreover, universities, and in particular, law schools, represent the training ground for
a large number of our Nation's leaders ..... In order to cultivate a set of leaders with
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly
open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.
id. at 2340-41 (citations omitted).
101. Id. It is appropriate to note thatJustice Thomas's argument that racial diversity does not serve
its beneficiaries because students admitted pursuant to the policy do not fare as well academically as their
colleagues does not deprive the diversity rationale of its legitimacy. Id. at 2361. The beneficiaries of the
diversity rationale include every student in the classroom. Concerned as the rationale is with improving the
intellectual environment for all of the admitted students, it achieves its goal by ensuring racial heterogeneity
in the classroom even if diversity admits do not perform at the same level as their classmates.
102. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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A. Making the Case for Racial Diversity
The majority was presented with a considerable number of studies
that provided empirical support for the educational value of racial
diversity.l"3 It is pot clear why the Grutter majority declined to make
more than honorable mention of this evidence, particularly when it
characterized it as persuasive. "' Patricia Gurin, Professor of Psychology
at the University of Michigan, and Interim Dean of the College of
Literature, Science, and the Arts, conducted the most extensive
longitudinal study of this issue using national and Michigan student
databases to chart and measure the educational yield of racial diversity.
The results of her extensive study reveal that racial diversity has
expansive benefits for majority and minority students alike and serves to
enhance the education that students receive by motivating them to think
in more complex ways.0 5 Her study establishes that the reconciliation
of information obtained by virtue of exposure to different experiences
with preexisting ideas requires effortful and conscious thinking and
stimulates greater mental activity and growth in intellectual and
academic proficiency.0 6 Two of America's leading educators, William
Bowen and Derek Bok, conducted a study that measured the educa-
tional impact of racial and ethnic diversity and published their findings
in The Shape of the River: The Long Term Consequences of Considering Race in
College and Universiy Admissions. 7 The results of their study confirm that
racial experiential diversity serves important educational goals.' 08
The Law School presented three categories of educational interests
furthered by racial diversity that fall within the scope of its educational
mission: learning outcomes, democracy outcomes, and outcomes
103. See, e.g., DARYL G. SMTrrH, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES,
DIVERSITY WORKS: THE EMERGINGPICTUREOFHow STUDENTS BENEFIT(2000) (presenting an overview
of the latest research and including an annotated bibliography of more than 300 different research studies
from across the nation); AMERICANCOUNCILONEDUCATION&AMERICANASSOCIATIONOFUNIVERSITY
PROFESSORS, DoESDI\VERSITY MAKEADIFFERENCE(2000); Mareen T. Hallinan, Diversiy Effects on Student
Outcomes: Social Science Rdence, 59 OHIO ST, LJ. 733 (1998);. Mitchell Chang & Alexander W. Astin, Racial
Diversiy in Higher Education: Does a Racin1ty Mived Student Population Affect Education Outcomes?, DIVERSITY
DIGEST, Winter 1997 (relating the results of a 1996 study of 300 campuses, which found that racially-mixed
student populations have positive effects on retention, overall college satisfaction, college grade point average
and intellectual and social self-confidence, all of which fall within the scope of the educational mission of
institutions of higher learning).
104. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340.
105. "Students learn better when the learning occurs in a setting where they are confronted w ith
others who are unlike themselves." Expert Report, supra note 43, at 244.
106. Id. at 249-251.
107. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 91.
108. Id.
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related to living and working in a diverse society. "' While the majority
emphasized the educational relevance of democracy and socialization
outcomes, it gave negligible consideration to learning outcomes.
Learning outcomes relate to cognitive processes and are principally
concerned with the aptitude for thinking and learning, which bear
directly on students' academic performance."'l Much of the empirical
evidence establishing the educational relevance of racial heterogeneity
is premised upon the socio-psychological theory of thinking, which
asserts that much of our thinking is non-conscious, automatic, and
rote.11' The environment best tailored to promoting non-conscious
thinking is experientially homogeneous because its uniformity serves
primarily to legitimate conventional experiences and exposures.'" 2 This
type of thinking is paradigmatically the antithesis of the thought
processes in which higher education students are encouraged to
engage."' Engaged thinking, as compared to non-conscious thinking,
is characterized by creativity and originality, and serves primarily to
motivate students to think outside of, rather than within, the proverbial
109. Hallinan, supra note 103, at 737 ("In the educational sphere, racial and ethnic diversity are
believed to affect a number of student outcomes. Diversity is expected to affect students' academic growth,
their attitudes and feelings toward intergroup relations, satisfaction with their educational institution,
involvement in school and the learning process .... Moreover, student diversity is believed to have an
impact on students' educational and occupational aspirations and attainment.").
110. "Students who experienced the most racial and ethnic diversity in classroom settings and in
informal interactions with peers showed the greatest engagement in active thinking processes, growth in
intellectual engagement and motivation, and growth in intellectual and academic skills." Expert Report,
supra note 45, at 250.
11I. "In fact much of the 'thinking' that we do is actually mindless, the result of previous learning that
has become so routine or scripted that thinking is unnecessary." Id at 249.
112. In Bakke, Justice Powell invokes the eloquent defense asserted on behalf of diversity by then-
President of Princeton University William Bowen who stated,
[A] great deal ofleaming occurs informally. It occurs through interactions among students
ofboth sexes; ofdifferent races, religions and backgrounds; who come from cities and rural
areas, from various states and countries; who have a wide variety of interests, talents, and
perspectives; and who are able, directly or indirectly, to learn from their differences and to
stimulate one another to reexamine even their most deeply held assumptions about
themselves and their world. As a wise graduate of ours observed in commenting on this
aspect ofthe educational process, "People do not learn very much when they are surrounded
by the likes of themselves."
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 n.48 (1978); see also Hallinan, supra note 103, at
747 (citing Poppy Lauretta McLeod et al., Ethnic D'ersity and Creatizity in Small Groups, 27 SMALLGROUPRES.
248, 253 (1996) ("It has been reported that in a sample of undergraduate and graduate students, ethnic
diversity in problem solving tasks leads to solutions that are more feasible and more effective than in all
Anglo groups.").
113. "Educational institutions plainly want to find ways to engage the deeper, less automatic mode of
thinking . . . Complex thinking occurs when we encounter people who are unfamiliar to us, when they
.encourage us to think or act in new ways, when relationships are unpredictable, and when people we
encounter hold different kinds of expectations of us." Expert Report, supra note 45, at 250.
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box.1 4 This type of learning requires a more heterogeneous environ-
ment that allows for the challenging of conventional thought and
inspires analysis informed by different experiences.' 1 3 These sophisti-
cated thinking processes take advantage of the cognitive disequilibrium
that results when one attempts to reconcile one's experiences with
divergent experiences. 116 Racial heterogeneity provides a diverse set of
experiences, which serve to create the synergy essential to engaged
learning.
A 1999 study conducted by Gary Orfield and Dean Whitla surveyed
students at two of the nation's top law schools about the educational
relevance of racial and ethnic heterogeneity17 The data obtained from
this study, which reflects that students experienced racial diversity as
enhancing their education, also confirms the educational yield of racial
diversity. Interpretation is a key aspect of higher order thinking, and
experience significantly informs interpretive processes." 8 There is a.
114. Id.
115. Neil Rudenstine, Harvard University, The President's Report 1993-1993 p. 3 3 (characterizing
diversity as an educational resource comparable to faculty, research, and library resources); Patricia Gurin,
The Compelling Need for Diversity in Higher Education, at http://vww.umich.edu/urel/admissions/
legal/expert/summ.html; see also Association of American Universities, On the Importance of Diversity in
University Admissions, in N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1997, at A27. The statement provides in pertinent part:
[WVe write] to express our strong conviction concerning the continuing need to take into
account a %ide range of considerations-including ethnicity, race, and gender-as we
evaluate the students whom wse select for admission.
We speak first and foremost as educators. We believe that our students benefit
significantly from education that takes place within a diverse setting. In the course of their
university education, our students encounter and learn from others who have backgrounds
and characteristics very different from their own. As we seek to prepare students for life in
the twenty-first century, the educational value of such encounters wvill become more
important, not less, than in the past.
Avery substantial portion ofour curriculum is enhanced by the discourse made possible
by the heterogenous backgrounds of our students. Equally, a significant part of education in
our institutions takes place outside the classroom, in extracurricular activities where students
learn how to work together, as well as to compete; hows to exercise leadership, as well as to
build consensus. If our institutional capacity to bring together a genuinely diverse group of
students is removed-or severely teduced-then the quality and texture of the education we
provide will be significantly diminished.
We therefore reaffirm our commitment to diversity as a value that is central to the very
concept of education in our institutions.
116. See generally JEAN PIAGET, THE EQUILIBRIUM OF COGNITIVE STRUCTUREs: THE CENTRAL
PROBLEM OF INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT (1975).
117. Gary Orfield & Dean Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education: Student Evperiences in Leading Law Schools,
in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (Gary Orfield &
Michael Kurleander eds., 1999).
118. Id. at 164. "Understanding the nature of law requires understanding the social and economic
conditions in which law is applied. Many laws and court decisions rest on assumptions about such
conditions, and in many instances it is necessary to understand such conditions (and the differing views about
them) in order to evaluate court decisions, states and legal doctrines." Id.
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compelling correlation between the breadth, depth, and nature of one's
experience and the breadth, depth, and nature of one's interpretation
of an issue or idea. However, the, correlation .may .not adequately
acknowledge that a learning environment comprised of persons with
substantially divergent exposures and experiences may be as instructive
to one's interpretive abilities as having the experience itself."9 The
racial diversity rationale embraces this proposition as its central thesis.
A premium is placed on the ability of graduate and undergraduate
students to discern, comprehend, and express multifaceted aspects of the
issues, concepts, and problem sets that they, encounter. 2 ' The most
intellectually astute students are able to appreciate and articulate the
supporting and obverse aspects of their analysis. To train minds to
recognize and comprehend multiple interpretations of an issue or idea
and to facilitate the expansion of their interpretative abilities to include
a multitude of perspectives and considerations requires exposure to
experiences distinct from their own. Experiential diversity serves as a
learning and teaching tool that allows students to incorporate into their
knowledge base different considerations, sensibilities, and lines of
reasoning, which serve to exponentially augment their analytical
proficiency.' 2' Providing students with a learning environment that
serves to challenge and supplement the ways in which they engage in
problem solving and analysis is one of the chief educational aims of
institutions of higher learning and is served by the racial heterogeneity
of the student body.
The majority needed to establish that the Law School proved the
educational relevance of racial diversity in intellectual terms. Its
analysis, bereft as it was of any substantive examination of the nexus
between racial diversity and learning outcomes, provided no guidance
to educational institutions about how to calibrate their admissions
processes to achieve racial diversity's educational yield and qualify for
the constitutional protection the majority afforded the Law School in
119. Id. at 160. As one student participant in the.Orfield-Whitla study of the educational relevance
of diversity in the law school context observed, "Being confronted with opinions from different
socioeconomic and ethnic realms forces you to develop logical bases for the opinions you have and to discard
those not based on such logic. You simply are forced to think more critically about your opinions when you
know that people with differing opinions are going to ask you to explain yourself." Id.
120. Id. at 147 ("Law is an area in which effective analysis and advocacy obviously require as deep an
understanding as possible of various points of viewv on key legal issues and of the social and economic realities
in which they arise.").
121. "Indeed, one of the most important objectives of American legal education is to cultivate in law
students the ability to understand an issue from many perspectives at the same time." Expert Report,supra
note 45, at 256.
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Grutter.122 The majority could have provided a utilitarian analysis of
racial diversity; instead it published a categorical endorsement of the
principle without regard for the particulars of the underlying justifica-
tion.
V. CONCLUSION
As the Supreme Court deliberated over the constitutionality of the
racial diversity rationale, the nation held its breath, anxiously anticipat-
ing an opinion that would provide a contemporary consideration of the
race concept and a thoughtful examination of the relevance of race to
pedagogic aims. Both proponents and opponents of the diversity
rationale were disappointed by the Court's vacuous analysis of the
justification, which endorsed the rationale without examining it. The
Grutter majority's refusal to accord racial heterogeneity and its educa-
tional yield judicious consideration sabotaged the efficacy of the
rationale and ultimately nullified the legitimacy of the justification.
The majority failed to distinguish adequately between racial diversity
and the remedial affirmation action rationale and failed to demonstrate
the appreciable nexus between racial heterogeneity and educational
prerogatives. The most egregious error committed by the majority,
however, was its reluctance to consider race according to its exogeneic
aspect, which impaired its ability to define the compelling interest at
issue with particularity. The majority's cryptic characterization of the
compelling interest served by racial heterogeneity distorted the
symmetry determination inherent to the narrowly-tailored prong of
strict scrutiny and provoked the disastrous result in Gratz.
The patronizing character of the majority's endorsement of racial
diversity was reinforced by its reticence to conduct an examined con-
sideration of race, which would have required the majority to recognize
the divergent and educationally relevant experiences of those separated
by the color line. The contempt implicit in its unwillingness to regard
the racial experience as something of value relegated race to the status
of an issue only to be spoken of in hushed tones. The majority's
spurious consideration of the justification divests it of the legitimacy
inherent to its assertion that racial heterogeneity is educationally
relevant and casts its affirmation of the rationale as a political accommo-
dation, when it is actually in the dialogue between truth and evidence
that racial diversity establishes its legitimacy.
122. Grutter %. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2349-50 (2003) (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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